that are not explicitly excluded from the Proposal are reported at fair value on the balance sheet and changes in their fair values are reported in operating income.^ The Proposal does not change the accounting for items being hedged, so hedging relationships will be properly reflected in earnings only if the hedged item happens to be fairvalued on both the balance sheet and income statement.
The JWG's position on hedge accounting contradicts existing U.S. GAAP that permits hedge accounting for derivatives that qualify as part of an effective hedging relationship (SFAS No. 133, FASB 1998) . Two forms of hedge accounting permitted in SFAS No. 133 allow firms to match the timing ofthe recognition of gains or losses associated with derivative instruments to that ofthe eamings associated with the hedged item. For fair value hedges, the gain or loss on the derivative instrument and the change in fair value of the hedged item are recognized in operating earnings as they occur. For cash flow hedges, the gain or loss associated with the effective (ineffective) portion of the derivative hedge is recognized in other comprehensive income (operating earnings) as it occurs. The gain or loss associated with the effective portion ofthe hedge is subsequently amortized into operating eamings to match the eamings effect of the hedged item.
Although the Proposal differs substantially from current U.S. GAAP, it does not deviate radically from the trajectory of U.S. standards. The FASB states in SFAS No. 133 (para. 216 ) that the standard "is an additional step in the Board's project on financial instruments and is intended to address the immediate problems about the recognition and measurement of derivatives while the Board's vision of having all financial instruments measured at fair value in the statement of financial position is pursued." Fvirther, in a summary of differences between the Proposal and its Preliminary Views in its preface to the proposal (see page iv ofthe Proposal), the FASB states that both documents "would affect hedge accounting similarly. Both would preclude any form of hedge accounting that affects accoimting and reporting for a financial instrument, and neither would change existing hedge accounting that does not involve the accounting and reporting for a financial instrument."
The JWG states that there is no "conceptual or practical" reason for derivative instnmients to be an exception to the elimination of hedge accoimting.^ The Committee disagrees with the elimination of hedge accounting for derivatives for two reasons. First, the Proposal does not fair-value all financial instruments and associated or similar items, such as insurance contracts, leases, servicing rights, firm commitments, and intangible assets that are associated with financial instruments, such as core deposit intangibles. Derivatives are often used to hedge these items. We favor fair valuation of essentially all of these items, which would reduce the need for special hedge accounting. In the absence of fair value accounting for these items, however, we favor fair value hedge accounting as in SFAS No. 133 when these items are hedged by derivatives.
Second, derivatives are often used to hedge exposures-normally nonfinancial exposures or anticipated transactions-that are not amenable to fair valuation and/or fair value hedge accounting. The objective of such hedging is usually to reduce cash flow or eamings volatility, not fair value volatihty. To achieve this objective, hedge accounting Paragraph 136 of the Proposal provides an exception for reporting certain translation gains and losses that are presented outside the income statement under IASC standards. Paragraphs 7.1-7.22 of the Proposal justify the "no exceptions" policy.
for such exposures requires deferral of income statement recognition of gains and losses on the derivative hedge until the corresponding income or cash flow effects of the hedged exposures are recognized. We refer to this as hedge accounting with deferral of hedge gains and losses. There are at least three possible approaches to deferring gains and losses on the hedging instrinnent. First, these gains and losses could be recorded in an owners' equity account, such as other comprehensive income, consistent with cash flow hedge accounting under SFAS No. 133. Second, they could be recorded as adjustments to the basis of hedged items. Third, they could be recorded as separate liabilities and assets, respectively. A significant disadvantage of the third approach is that these liabilities Eind assets do not, by themselves, meet the conceptual definitions of liabilities and assets.
Advantages and Disadvantages of Hedge Accounting
We recognize that hedge accounting has disadvantages given fair value accounting for financial instruments. However, based on our analysis of the literatin-e, we conclude that the advantages of such hedge accoimting outweigh the disadvantages.
The principal advantage of hedge accounting is that it recognizes the earnings effects of (the effective portion of) the hedge instrument and the hedged item in the same periods and in proportion. The result is less time-series earnings volatility than would occur under the Proposal. A reduction in accounting volatility is appropriate here because the purpose of hedging typicEilly is to reduce the volatility of earnings or cash flows. Thus, an accounting system that reports more volatile earnings for firms that hedge effectively does not provide a representationally faithful view of these firms' risk management activities. Reduced volatility associated with hedge accounting is not an advantage per se. It is only an advantage to the extent that it better reflects the underlying economics of effective hedging transactions.
Empirical evidence supports our position that the matching aspects of hedge accounting reduce the volatihty in a firm's time-series of earnings. Francis (1990) provides the most direct evidence about the impact of fair value accounting compared to hedge accounting on earnings volatility. Using data collected from 76 commercial banks, Francis (1990) simulates earnings over time for each bank with and without hedge accounting. She assumes banks economically hedge 100 percent of their one-year, fiveyear, and over five-year gap, but hedge accounting is permitted only for hedges of oneyear gap. She finds that earnings are significantly more volatile for over 90 percent of the banks when gains and losses on hedges are recognized immediately (no hedge accounting) rather than deferred (hedge accounting). This result remains when she assumes hedge ratios as low as 50 percent of banks' gap positions. Barth et al. (1995) find that fair value accounting for financial instruments without hedge accounting increases significantly the volatihty of banks' capital and reported earnings, and raises the probability that they violate capital requirements. This study is based on annual samples of 26-137 banks over the 20-year period from 1971 to 1990. The authors create partial fair value financial statements using the fair values of investment securities provided in regulatory reports. While the mean unrealized securities gain is only $0,005 per share for the overall sample, the variance of securities gains and losses is substantial. Reflecting this variance, the authors estimate that 151 bankyear observations (7.6 percent of the sample) not violating regulatory capital requirements under historical cost accounting for investment securities would have done so under fair value accounting. In contrast, only 13 bank-year observations violate capital requirements under historical cost accounting but not fair value accounting. Moreover, the effect on annual income volatility is sizeable, with the variance of net income increasing by 38 percent on average under fair value accounting. A caveat to these results is that managers might have reduced this volatiUty by purchasing and selhng different securities during this time period if fair value accounting actually was in place.
In summary, Francis (1990) and Barth et al. (1995) strongly suggest that fair value accounting for financial instruments in the absence of hedge accoimting increases reported earnings volatility. Moreover, it is likely that the increased earnings volatility is economically nondescriptive. It is important to note, however, that Francis (1990) is the only paper we know of that documents that hedge accounting produces earnings volatility that more accurately reflects the risk reduction effects of hedge transactions. In this paper, hedging increases earnings volatility in the absence of hedge accounting despite a decrease in economic volatility designed into the simulation. In contrast, Barth et al. (1995) do not directly examine whether and how fair value gains and losses on investment securities affect economic volatihty at the firm level. This depends on the covariance between economic gains and losses on investment securities and the firm's other economic exposures. Bernard et al. (1995) note that the effect of fair value accovmting on earnings volatility depends on the completeness of fair value accoimting throughout the balance sheet. They also argue, as we do, that total aggregated earnings will not accurately reflect the volatility ofthe firm's net economic exposure imder the partial implementation of fair vEilue accounting envisioned in the Proposal.
Hedge accounting has three main disadvantages. First, most forms of hedge accounting measure the same exposiire differently depending on whether it is hedged or not, making comparisons of hedged and unhedged exposures difricvilt." Assume exposures are carried at (amortized) cost if not hedged, as is oflen the case. Under fair value hedge accoimting, exposures are carried at fair value if hedged. Hedge accoimting that defers gains (losses) by adjusting the basis ofthe hedged item, or as separate liabilities (assets), results in hedged exposures being carried at an approximation to fair value. This occurs because the deferred gains (losses) on the hedging instrument are recorded either directly or indirectly as offsetting losses (gains) on the hedged item. Thus, the net amount reported on the balance sheet for the hedged items and the deferred gains and losses approximates the fair value ofthe hedged item.^ The only exception to this disadvantage is cash flow hedge accounting under SFAS No. 133, which keeps the hedged exposure at cost.
A second and related disadvantage of hedge accounting with deferral of hedge gains and losses is that known gains and losses on hedging instruments are initially reported somewhere other than in net income, even though those gains and losses are attributable to the period. A third disadvantage of hedge accounting is that the discretion involved in deciding what is or is not a hedging instrument or in assessing hedge effectiveness can contribute to earnings management.
One could argue that this is not really a disadvantage, since a hedged exposure is not comparable to an unhedged exposure. Obviously, the net amount reported on the balance sheet will not always be equal to the fair value of the hedged item. For example, the two will not be equal when the hedge is not entered into coincidently with the origination ofthe underlying asset or liability, or when the hedge is taken off before the asset is sold (liability is repsdd).
The Committee believes that the advantage of hedge accounting-economically descriptive earnings volatility even in the absence of fair value accounting for hedged items-outweighs the disadvantages of hedge accounting. This position is based on research evidence reviewed below that earnings volatility is costly.
We favor the retention of hedge accoimting for hedges of financial instruments not fair-valued under the Proposal, nonfinancial exposures, and forecasted transactions. We recognize the many complex implementation decisions required to develop a workable hedge accounting standard, such as whether the deferral of gains and losses should be limited to the effective portion ofthe hedge, how to assess hedge effectiveness, and where to report deferred gains and losses. The resolution of such details might alter some Committee members' views as to the relative desirability of maintaining hedge accounting. The Committee believes that any hedge accounting system should not allow firms to "hide" deferred gains and losses on the balance sheet. In particular, information about changes in the fair value of hedging instruments is relevant and should be disclosed.
Research Supporting Hedge Accounting
Many empirical papers document a positive association between earnings (or cash flow) variability and a firm's cost of capital, or v£iriables related to the cost of capital. These results imply that volatility is an important firm characteristic that equity and debt market participants assess. Michelson et al. (1995) report differences in mean annualized stock retiorns and betas for firms classified as smoothers and nonsmoothers. Firms are classified as smoothers if the coefficient of variation in a one-period change of income, measured in various ways, is less than the coefficient of variation in the same period change in sales. Retvims and betas are calculated over the ten-year period from 1982-1991. For a sample of firms from the S&P 500, the authors conclude that smooth income is associated with lower annualized retvirns and lower market risk. The authors also document a positive association between smooth income and firm size. Bitner and Dolan (1996) document a positive association between Tobin's q as a measin-e of firm value and the smoothness of a firm's earnings (net income), controlling for earnings growth, gross profit margins, leverage, asset size, and industry membership. In addition, the paper investigates whether the market valuation is affected by concurrent changes in R&D (as a proxy for discretionary spending) or income associated with changes in the application of other accounting principles (as a proxy for earnings management). This investigation examines whether the market distinguishes between earnings that are naturally smooth and those that are managed to be smooth. Artificial smoothing resulting from accoxmting changes is associated with a negative impact on Tobin's q. All tests use both net income and operating income. The sample includes 218 firms, mostly in manufacturing industries. According to the authors, the market values smoothness, suggesting that it views volatile earnings as a signal of systematic risk.
Stevens and Jose (1992) find a significant positive association between the stability of a firm's dividends aroxmd an underlying growth trend and Tobin's q. However, stable dividends are valued only when the firm also has stable earnings. Minton and Schrand (1999) and Gebhardt et al. (1999) examine the associations between cash fiow and earnings variability, respectively, and a variety of proxies for a firm's cost of capital such as bid/ask spreads, bond ratings, and ex ante measures of risk premia. Both studies find that higher variability is associated with higher capital costs. Similarly, Beaver et al. (1970) report that earnings volatihty is positively associated with beta. O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) find that market assessments of unsystematic (diversifiable) risk are negatively associated with analyst following and that lower einalyst following is associated with a higher cost of capital.
Empirical evidence from event studies documents negative stock price reactions to accoimting volatility-increasing events, even when these events do not reflect an increase in economic exposure. The results of these studies suggest that equity investors believe the increased accounting volatility imposes real costs on firms through lower stock prices. Collins et al. (1981) docizment cross-sectional variation in negative abnormal returns related to the adoption of SFAS No. 19 for oil-and gas-producing companies. The expected effect of SFAS No. 19 on the financial statements for firms using full cost accounting was reduced retained earnings, increased debt-to-equity ratios, and increased earnings variability. The authors find more negative stock market reactions for firms with more contracts that rely on accounting numbers. Lys (1984) documents market reactions to announcements that changed the probability of adoption of SFAS No. 19. Abnormal returns of full cost firms that potentially faced a required switch to successful efforts accounting, and thus increased accounting volatility, were significantly negative on the date the exposure draft was announced. A zero investment portfolio composed of long positions in successful efforts firms and short positions in full cost firms had a positive abnormal return on the date the exposure draft was made public. Abnormal returns were more negative the greater a firm's default risk at the time of the exposure draft, as measured by the debt-to-equity ratio, and the greater the expected magnitude of the reduction in a firm's equity resulting from the switch to successful efforts accounting.
However, Frost emd Bernard (1989) fail to find significamt adverse economic consequences from required write-downs related to the SEC's rule on full cost accounting in the oil and gas industry. The sample firms have GAAP-based debt covenants that were potentially affected by the nile. The mandated accoimting change reduced slack or caused technical violation of debt covenants for approximately 40 percent of the debt agreements in the sample. For the two technical violations observed, lenders provided waivers. In other instances, private loan agreements were periodically revised (on average, every 18 months). These are ex post observations for the sample agreements; in expectation, the economic impact of technical violation was unclear. Comett et al. (1996) show a negative market reaction to the announcement of the fair value accounting standards for banks that is more negative for banks near their capital requirements. The results suggest that accoimting requirements that increase earnings volatility and thus increase the likelihood of violating bank capitsd requirements create real economic costs, unless regulators adjust for the accounting treatments. Salatka (1989) finds significantly negative abnormal returns for multinational firms surrounding the event dates leading up to the adoption of SFAS No. 8. This standard was the FASB's first codification of rules for accounting for foreign currency translation and was expected to create volatility in net income. The most significant negative returns occur on the date of the Exposure Draft release.
Specifically related to the effects of fair value accounting, Bernard et al. (1995) provide evidence that accounting-induced eEimings volatility is costly in the presence of bank capital regulations. They document that Danish banks with more volatile earnings hold higher capital. This outcome is positive to the extent that regulators were able to use earnings volatility to identify potentially troubled banks, as would be the case if this volatility implied a greater likelihood of default. This outcome is negative to the extent that healthy banks with earnings volatility in excess of their underlying economic volatility maintained economically lonnecessary capital "cushions," resulting in a deadweight loss. Barth et al. (1995) also acknowledge the increased regulatory risk associated with higher earnings variability and examine whether increased risks are reflected in share prices. As noted previously, this study finds that fair value accounting would lead to more volatile earnings for banks relative to historical cost accovmting and that banks would violate capital reqviirements more frequently. The study reports that the share prices of the sample banks reflect earnings volatility measured using historical cost accounting but not using fair value accounting. Similarly, the study reports that share prices do not reflect capital violations that would have occurred if fair value accounting were in place, but do reflect violations based on historical cost accoimting. We, like the authors, claim that these results should be interpreted with caution (Barth et al. 1995, 580) . Instead of implying that fair value accounting would not affect share prices, this study-conducted during a period in which the accounting regime was historical cost accounting-may simply imply that, in such a regime, fair value "volatility" and fair vEdue capital requirement violations were not costly.
Perhaps the most compelling evidence that firms view earnings volatility as costly is the fact that firms engage in costly activities to avoid volatility.^ There is £in abundaince of evidence that earnings sire "smoothed." Smoothing activities include not only earnings management and accounting method choices, but also transaction choices such as sales of assets or derivatives use. Cross-sectionsd analyses report that smoothing behavior, which is assumed to be costly, is most likely to occur when the benefits of reducing volatility are the greatest. The benefits are greatest when higher earnings variability leads to a reed cost for the firm or its managers. We do not cite the numerous papers that make these points as it is a fairly noncontroversial conclusion in the literature that firms smooth earnings to avoid costs.
It is worth noting that some papers discussed above examine the costs of earnings volatility and others examine the costs of cash flow volatility. None attempt to estimate the incremental cost of earnings volatility over cash flow volatility, or the volatility of firms' net economic exposures. Moreover, another caveat to this research is that the theoretical justification for the association between earnings volatility and a firm's cost of capital is limited. Trueman and Titman (1988) show that earnings volatility increases estimation errors by claimants about underlying cash flows, which increases the assessment of default probability, which increases the cost of capital. Barry and Brown (1985) also theorize a relation between discount rates and earnings volatility because this volatility is associated with estimation risk.
The empirical evidence above suggests that standard setters should be concerned about creating accounting volatility that does not reflect the volatility of firms' net economic exposures. Volatility is an important firm characteristic that equity and debt The Wharton/CIBC (1998) surveys of derivatives use by U.S. nonflneincial firms indicate that approximately 40 percent of firms that use derivatives report that they use derivatives to manage earnings volatility. In addition, insurers including Reliance National and AIG investigated offering "earnings insxirance" Qiisk 1999). market participeints sbould be able to assess accurately using the financial statements. In addition, firms oppose increased volatility on the practical grounds that it can create real costs due to tbe existence of incomplete contracts that rely on accounting numbers. Sucb contracts include explicit compensation and debt contracts or implicit regulatory contracts.
One may question whether standard setters should be concerned about tbe effects of increased accounting volatility on existing contracts because tbese contracts could be rewritten after new rules 2U"e proposed making the documented "costs" a temporary phenomenon. However, the Committee believes tbat the elimination of bedge accounting will result in contracting parties having to adjust economically nondescriptive accounting numbers on £in ongoing basis to recreate hedge accounting, and that tbis would be a needlessly inefficient outcome.
REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS
Repurchase agreements can in theory be accounted for by tbe transferor in one of two ways: (1) as sales of assets coupled witb executory contracts to repurchase those or similar assets, or (2) as secured borrowings against the firm's assets. When repurchase agreements are accounted for as sales, no assets typically remain on the transferor's balance sheet. Intuitively, the transferred asset is effectively netted against the obligation to repurcbase the asset, in the same way that a forward contract to purchase the asset would be. In contrast, when repurchase agreements are accounted for as secured borrowings, both gross assets and gross liabilities of equal amounts typically remain on the transferor's balance sheet. Thus, the choice of sale or secured borrowing accounting for repurchase agreements affects the transferor's balance sheet classification ofthe repurchase agreement but not its owners' equity or net income. The classification decision, however, has a very significant effect on the reported leverage of many financial institutions.
The Committee believes that repurchase agreements are typically secured borrowings in economic substance. Specifically, by far the most common types of repurchase agreements in the U.S. are short-term (e.g., one-day) repurchase agreements in securities with liquid replacement markets, such as U.S. Treasury, govemment agency, and government-sponsored entity securities. In our view, such repurchase agreements are economically secured borrowings, because the transferor receives the value and risk of economically identical securities when the repurchase agreement terminates.
The Committee disagrees with two aspects ofthe Proposal that make sale accounting required for such repurchase agreements, as discussed below. While our discussion of these aspects refers only to repurchase agreements, for which these aspects are paramoimt, it Eilso applies to other transfers of financial instruments to a lesser extent.
Should transferees' practical ability to sell or repledge assets and, relatedly, the existence of liquid markets for replacement assets affect the transferor's accounting for repurchase agreements?
In the Proposal, the party (transferor or transferee) that controls the transferred financial assets in the repurchase agreement records those assets on its balance sheet. That party is typically the transferee, so repurchase agreements are typically accounted for as sales. Specifically, paragraphs 55 and 56(a) ofthe Proposal contain the following three distinct ideas: 1) the transferor should recognize only the specific financial assets it controls.
2) the transferor must have given up control over the transferred financial assets if the transferee has the practical ability to sell or repledge those assets, and 3) the existence of a liquid market in replacement assets implies that the trsinsferee has the practiced ability to sell or repledge the assets.
The Committee's disagreements pertain to the first and third ideas. With regard to the first idea, the Committee believes that the transfer of control over finjincial instruments does not necessarily imply that the risk and return of those instriiments are transferred. When transfer of control and transfer of risk and return do not go together, as is tjrpically the case in repurchase agreements, we believe that transfer of risk amd return should govern the accounting. With regard to the third idea, the Committee believes that the existence of a liquid market in replacement assets primarily implies that the transferee's ability to sell or repledge the assets is inconsequential to (i.e., does not affect the risk or return retained by) the transferor. In particular, the transferor is indifferent about whether the original assets or economically identical replacement eissets are returned.
Under the Proposal, short-term repurchase agreements in securities with liquid replacement markets are accounted for as sales at net amounts, because the existence of liquid markets in replacement assets implies that the transferee has the effective ability to sell or pledge the transferred financial assets. As Eirgued above, we believe such agreements should be accounted for as secured borrowings at gross amounts, because the transferor receives the vadue and risk of economically identical securities when the repvirchase agreement terminates, reg£u"dless of whether the transferee does or does not sell or pledge the securities.
Secured borrowing accounting for short-term repurchase agreements is consistent with current accounting practice in the U.S., but inconsistent with the accounting treatment in the Proposal. We prefer the current accounting because it captures the value and risk retained by the transferor, while the accounting in the Proposal does not. We do not prefer it simply because it is the current accounting.
We also note that our concern is not with the income recognition effects of sale accounting. Because most financial instruments are fair-valued under the Proposal, gains and losses are recognized as they occur. Our concern is that the balance sheet will not accurately refiect the sources of risk and return for the firm. Do repurchase agreements for which the transferee has the practical ability to sell or repledge the assets constitute "executory contracts" that the transferor should account for net on the halance sheet?
The Committee believes that repurchase agreements for which the transferee has the practical ability to sell or repledge the assets (hereafter repurchase agreements) are not executory contracts in any meaningful sense. Execution of repurchase agreements generally does not involve substantial future effort by either the transferor or the transferee. Rather, execution of repurchase agreements simply requires the passage of time and the return of pieces of financial paper. Accordingly, we believe that most repurchase agreements should be accounted for as secured borrowings at gross amounts.
We base this conclusion in part on the fact that the alternative to most repurchase agreements is unsecured borrowing and lending, such as federal funds transactions by financial institutions. In addition, the term of repurchase agreements, commonly one day, is usually a small fraction of the life of the transferred assets. Repurchase agreements with longer terms often insulate the transferee from the risk of the assets through contractual provisions in which the transferor receives the interest or dividend payments or gains and losses on the transferred assets.
We recognize, however, that longer-term repurchase agreements that expose the tremsferee to the risk and return of the transferred financial assets for a significant portion of their life do exist. We believe that such repurchase agreements should be accounted for as partial sales and partial secured borrowings consistent with a financial components approach.
We also recognize that forward contracts to purchase securities, which yield the same exposure for the transferor as repurchase agreements, are accoimted for at net amounts and not the gross amounts we propose. While we do not want to open up the issue of net accounting for derivatives at this time, we believe that forward contracts are better described through gross accoimting. More importantly, the Committee believes that repurchase agreements are most commonly used as a practical alternative to unsecured borrowing and lending, and so view unsecured borrowing and lending as the most relevant comparable transaction.
GUARANTEES BY TRANSFERORS
For transfers of financial instruments accounted for as sales, the Proposal reqvures that transferors recognize liabilities equal to the maximum amount of guarantees (paras. 64a and 64c). Because the maximum amount may exceed the fair value of guEirantees, the Proposal is at odds with U.S. GAAP as reflected in SFAS No. 140 (FASB 2000) , which recognizes such guarantees at fair value. The Committee generally prefers the SFAS No. 140 approach.
We recognize that transfers of financial instruments in which the transferor retains risks through guarantees and other means that are disproportionately large relative to the fair value that is retained are problematic under the SFAS No. 140 approach. The main concern is usually that the retained asset components are overvalued and the retained liability components are undervalued. This concern is especially important when judgment is required to estimate the fair value of the retained and transferred components of the financial instruments.
The Committee views the Proposal's requirement that the transferor recognize a liability for the maximum amoimt of guarantees in paragraphs 64a and 64c as £ui attempt to mitigate this very real problem by overlaying a risk transfer perspective on the fair value transfer perspective in SFAS No. 140. The maximum guarantee effectively limits the amoimt of the transferred financial assets that are treated as sold. A dollar of additional maximum guarantee reduces the amount treated as sold by a dollar, regardless of the fair value of the guarantee or the transferred components of the imderlying financial instruments. We agree that both maximimi and the fair value of guarantees provide insight into their economic substance. We are concerned, however, that blending risk transfer and fair value transfer perspectives as in the Proposal may not portray either perspective clearly.
We are also concerned that there are many means by which transferors can retain disproportionate risks, such as the retention of risky residual interests, and that the JWG proposes more stringent accoimting for guarantees than for these other means. While the Committee is not aware of any statistics regarding the extent of the use of guarantees vs. other means of risk retention, our reading of seciiritization footnotes suggests that guarantees are unimportemt compared to the retention of risky residual interests.
We suggest that transfers of financial instruments that involve significant risk transfer-even if disproportionate risk is retained by the transferor-be accoionted for as sales using a fair value transfer perspective as in SFAS No. 140, as this perspective is consistent with fair value accounting and, thus, most likely to yield comparable accounting for similar transactions.' In contrast, for transfers of financial instruments that do not involve significant risk transfer, whether because of guarantees or through other means, we favor secured borrowing accounting.* We believe the JWG should provide information about disproportionate risk retention by the transferor through risk-related disclosures such as those proposed in paragraphs 188 and 189. The JWG should consider two issues related to our suggestion for accounting treatment and disclosure. First, as noted above, a fair value transfer perspective can introduce significant accounting risk in the financial statements, since judgment is often required to estimate the fair values of risky retained components. It is likely that this estimation error increases with the risk retained. Second, this approach requires a definition of "disproportionate" as a criterion for requiring additional disclosure. The Committee does not view crafting such a definition as a major problem.
SUMMARY
The Committee opposes three aspects ofthe JWG Proposal on the fair valuation of financial instruments.
1. We oppose the elimination of hedge accounting because hedge accounting results in lower earnings volatility that better refiects the economic substance of hedging relationships. The Committee's views are consistent with public opposition to fair value accoimting. In response to the 1996 FASB Exposure Draft on fair value accoimting, 61 percent mentioned increased earnings volatility as a result; only 44 percent ofthe responses mentioned increased balance sheet volatility.® Our concems are also consistent with the concems raised in the dissents ofthe French £ind German delegations in Appendix A ofthe Proposal. 2. We oppose the treatment of most repurchase agreements as sales rather than secured borrowings. Most repurchase agreements are very short-term and involve very liquid finsincial instruments and so are an alternative and economically similar to unsecured borrowing and lending.
For example, the G4+1 recently proposed something eikin to fair value accounting for leases. Leases oflen involve residual value guarantees that reiise much the same economic issues as the guarantees considered in the Proposed. We helieve that lease residual vahie guareuitees should he accounted for comparably to guaremtees in transfers of financial assets. At least two analogs exist in U.S. GAAP to our suggested approach of appl3dng secured borrowing accounting when there is no significcint risk transfer: (1) imder SFAS No. 28, no gain on sale is recognized in sale-leaseback treinsactions where the leaseback is for more than 90 percent of the asset; and (2) under SFAS No. 113, reinsurance accounting is not allowed when there is no reasonable possibility of significeint loss by the reinsurer. See Smithson (1999a, 1999b). 3. We oppose the recognition of guarantees by the transferor at their maximum amount. We recognize that risk retention by the transferor raises significant issues in accounting for transfers of financial instruments as sales. However, we do not believe that deviating from fair vadue accounting for guarantees hut not for other ways of retaining risk, such as the retention of risky residual interests, would yield comparable or neutral accounting. The German delegation raises much the same criticism.
